The history of Russia`s relations with Europe is similar to the oscillations of a pendulum – the warmer they become, the more aggravated the confrontation between them. Ukraine has been the geographical and geopolitical hostage of this fluctuation for many centuries. The colour of Kyiv on the political map depends on who is the winner in the confrontation between Europe and Russia. Can Russia be an equal partner for Europe without using force and fear?
What is the real value of Russian money invested in critical infrastructure – gas pipelines, media, democratic institutions?
Transatlantic unity was threatened for the first time since the Second World War.
The countries of the Baltic – Black Sea region are under threat and forced to find ways to enhance their collective security against conventional and non – conventional threats.
The report “Evidence of Russian presence and military aggression in Crimean autonomous republic and occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk oblast in 2014-2-17” is the project implemented by NGO Prosvita Institute with the support of NATO.
The report contains evidence on the Russian Federation Armed Forces presence and military aggression in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. All pieces of evidence were collected from open sources of information including private and official investigations, data from social networks of Russian Armed Forces active military personnel, Russian medias’ news reports etc. The report also contains an identification of Russian military equipment and active Russian military personnel by name, pieces of evidence on Russian Federation Armed Forces encroachment on Ukrainian territory as recorded by satellite imagery, data regarding Russian humanitarian convoys transportation, and international community reaction towards the investigated episodes of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Each video material, film or news story used in the report is accessible for viewing on a special YouTube channel called “Russian military aggression in Ukraine”
08.00 Registration, welcome coffee
09.00 Opening remarks
9:30 — 10:30 History: Lessons Learned?
Geographical, historical, and cultural aspects have always been and will remain crucial for geopolitical development of states, and the history of civilization has proven it more than once. The problem is that the lessons of history are often devalued; putting history aside means risking making the same mistakes that have already taken millions of lives in the past.
First and foremost, we mean the lessons after the end of the World War I and the Versailles Treaty signing, and the World War II: in particular, the values and foundations upon which the European Union was built.
10:30 — 11:00 Coffee break. Press conference
11:00 — 12:30 Understanding and Denying Threats
The annexation of Crimea and Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine has made it clear that the final aim of aggressive Russian policy is not Ukraine, but the broader West.
The Eastern European countries between the Baltic and the Black Sea are the potential further target of this aggression, experiencing overwhelming economic, informational, and even direct military threats. A common understanding of these threats in the region, as well as developing strategic defence and security cooperation is urgently needed in order to rebuild international security order.
12:30 — 14:00 Lunch
14:00 — 14:30 Media as critical infrastructure
Philip Seib, Annenberg School of Communication, University of Southern California (USA)
14:30 — 15:45 Critical Infrastructure: Resilience or Insecurity?
Acknowledging vulnerabilities. State policy to protect critical infrastructure. Ownership of critical infrastructure as a threat. Community resilience. Critical infrastructure in Donbas and Crimea.
The threat in this region has not yet been observed in the light of access to ports, airspace security, communications, economic development and, therefore, through the prism of security of the local population. In the era of non-conventional, non-linear hybrid wars these objects become a primary target for the aggressor, causing casualties and paralyzing the lives of societies. The difficulty in protecting such objects of critical infrastructure is often in that because they are rarely owned by the state, being a property of private individuals or even foreign agents. Protection of critical infrastructure requires effective state policy and development of a high level of community resilience.
15:45 — 16:15 Coffee break
16.15 – 17.15 Youth Panel
Future of Baltic-Black Sea Region. Youth’s Vision.
09:00 — 10:30 Militarization of Crimea: Challenges for the region
It has become obvious that annexation and further militarization of Crimea is a part of Russian aggressive military policy towards the West, aimed at Russian dominance over the international trade through one of its most important corridors, shaped by Black and the Mediterranean Sea. The western partners of Ukraine in the region face challenges in building collective security, even with the support of NATO. How shall international military cooperation in the region be built in order to balance the situation? What can Ukraine do in order to strengthen its position in the region and deter Russia from further aggression from the Southern flank?
10:30 — 11:00 Coffee break
11:00 — 12:30 Strategy in the Baltic-Black Sea Region: Guaranteeing Security Through the International Legal Framework
Are the international regulations of the situation in the Baltic-Black Sea region a decelerating factor or a launchpad for development? The conventions governing access to specific regions have been established in certain historical periods to provide the system of checks and balances. Can they still carry out this function and what can be done about them to help enhance security in the region?
12:30 — 13:30 Lunch
13:30 — 14:45 Ukrainian prisoners of war: without status, but with hope for coming back home
Key partner Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
Since the breakout of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the topic of the exchange of prisoners of war in Donbas has been the object of political bargaining and manipulation. The Ukrainian state has not managed to grant them the status they poss de facto, referring to them as hostages. Could the legal status of the prisoner of war influence the conditions of their detention or their release? What are the NATO standards and best international practices of exchange of prisoners? What could be the peculiarities in view of the hybrid war conditions?
14:45 — 15:30 Wrap-up session